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Agricultural Protection in Developing
Countries
Lilyan E. Fulginiti and Jason F. Shogren
Countries often have a Jekyll-Hyde relationship
with their agricultural sector-policy makers both
tax and subsidize agriculture. In the early stages
of a country's development, policy makers exploit agriculture through export taxes and overvalued exchange rates. In contrast, agricultural
policy in advanced industrial countries has
strongly protected domestic producers by means
of trade restrictions, direct price or income supports, and public investment.
The present paper explores why farmers are
taxed in poor countries and subsidized in rich
countries. Using the economic theory of contests to come to an understanding of the incentives for agricultural protectionism, we f ~ ssketch
t
a framework for an excludable and rivalrous rent.
We then apply this framework to agricultural
protectionism in developing countries.
A Contest for Agricultural Protection

Olson ( 1982) uses his theory of collective action
to explain the dual treatment of agriculture and
industry. Benefits of collective lobbying for a
rent must be shared among the lobbying groupeither shared equally for a public good or according to some sharing rule for a divisible private good. If there is a great number of potential
beneficiaries, the cash of securing the good may
not be borne equally by all who benefit. Therefore, there is little incentive to engage in collective lobbying to secure a government rent,
and such groups are unorganized or poorly managed. This is so with the agricultural sector in
less-developed countries. In comparison, the
manufacturing sector has fewer players. There,
because of lower transaction costs, the benefits
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of collective action outweigh the costs, a fact
implying strong lobbying to obtain the rent (Bates
and Rogerson). But as the transaction costs of
forming a collective decrease through improved
transportation, education, and information systems, the balance of power can shift. Eventually, the agricultural sector will find it profitable
to form an effective collective lobby, which will
benefit from government subsidies.
If the rent is a private good, excludable and
rivalrous in consumption, several other issues
become important. For example, if the rent is a
direct subsidy to the industrial or the agricultural
sector, players within the sector compete to receive support. The overall rent is depleted as
one player receives the subsidy. The economic
theory of contests becomes a useful framework
to further our understanding of such cases (Tullock). Next, we sketch the framework for a rentseeking contest between agricultural and industrial sectors.
By selecting the rent and who receives it, the
regulator plays the key role in this model (Applebaum and Katz). Let G, = S, + TI be the rent
(i = 1, 0, . . ., k), where S, is the subsidy won
and T, the tax avoided if the player is victorious.
The regulator can award the rent either to industry or agriculture. For each strategy, the regulator's expected utility is represented by

where .ni(.) is the likelihood of the regulator's
remaining in office given the rent-seeking effort
of agriculture X and industry Y. Rent-seeking
efforts depend upon relative strength of the sector a,the level of rent G,, the sector's sharing
rule m1 or m,,, and political or institutional environment W . Let TR = P(X(-) + Y ( - ) )be the
fraction of rent-seeking expenditures received
by the regulator, 0 5 @ 5 1; 5 the nonmonetary
social welfare concerns (possibly zero); and z
the regulator's income if -she is removed from
office. W can be interpreted as the nature of the
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playing field. The regulator's problem is to select the strategy maximizing her expected utility:

If information is imperfect, groups must decide how much effort to invest to increase the
probability of winning the reward. Individual
players in the agricultural and the industrial sectors expend efforts, x, and y,, to increase the
1ikeIihood of winning a subsidy and avoiding a
iax. The probability that the agricultural sector
wins some rent is p,(X, aHW) = ErIi p , ( . ) ,
whereX = Z:=, x, and Y = Ey=,y,. If a > 1,
manufacturing is more poweriul than agriculture; a < I implies the opposite. The strength
term represents factors influencing the productivity of rent seeking. We initially assume a >
1 in developing countries. We &stify this assumption by noting Olson's argument that, although in the early stage of a country's economic development the majority of its people
engage in agriculture, demand for farm price
supports is typically quite weak as a result of
the high cost of coordinating farmers' rent-seeking activities. AgriculturaI populations are relatively uneducated, are scattered over a wide
area, and have poor communication and transportation systems. Benefits from lobbying for
higher prices are minimal because a small share
of subsistence farmers' production is sold. No
other significant groups, such as domestic industries supplyingf& inpuh, have yet emerged
to argue for policies favorable to agriculture.
In contrast, demand for industrial assistance
policies is relatively strong. Industrialists are
typically better educated than agriculturalists, are
based in urban centers, and are relatively small
in numbers. The cost of collective political lobbying activity is comparatively low. Two major
benefits arise from lobbying against subsidized
agricultural prices. First, increased agricultural
export earnings increase the supply of foreign
exchange, lowering ~ t sprice. Currency appreciation lowers the local currency price of impon-competing manufactures. Second, benefits
accrue from the impact of Iow food prices on
wages. Industrialists support workers in resisting food price increases for fear of increased living cost and resulting demands of higher wages.
Because urban wage earners have low incomes
and a large Engel coefficient, high food prices
tend to trigger urban disruption.
Players in agricultural and manufacturing sectors now select first, the optimal sharing rule
detailing how the prize will be divided within

Amev J . Agv Econ.

the sector if victorious, second, the optimal timing of effort (should the group move first or after its opponent has moved?), and third, the level
of effort. If G is a public good, then the sharing
rule will not depend upon effort. If G is a divisible prize, as in protectionism, a sharing rule
must explicitly examine how the prize will be
divided. Let the shares to individuals in the two
sectors be

where cp (0 5 cp 5 1 ) is the weight factor (cp =
0, implying an effort-independent sharing rule,
and rp = 1, implying an effort-dependent rule).
Baik and Shogren demonstrate that if n > m ,
the larger group (agriculture) will emphasize the
effort-independent sharing rule and the other
group (manufacturing) will emphasize the effort-dependent sharing rule. Even if the reward
is a private good, individuals in the agricultural
group will have an incentive to free ride, a fact
suggesting less effort in the contest.
Given the optimal sharing rules, players in both
agricultural and manufacturing sectors noncooperatively select x, and y, to maximize expected
profits:
Max[p,(X,aYIW)Gq, - x , ]

i = I, . . . , n

Max [p,(X, cry1 W)GU,.- y,] j

=

1, . . . , m ,

where p,(X, ~ Y ~ W )=Gc:I~p i - G, and p,,(X,
a~ IW)G = C:=,-,p, . G,. Figure 1 illustrates the
model for the simple case of four rent levelsno rent ( G o ) ,low rent ( G , ) , high rent (CH),and
very high rent (G,). The first row in the payoff
vectors reflect the regulator's expected utility;
the second and third rows are expected payoffs
to agriculture and industry.
Given that the contest bias term affects effort,
the sector supported by the regulator may well
change as the economy develops. As subsistence farmers become more commercialized, the
share of market production expands, increasing
potential benefits from seeking higher production prices. As the farm population declines, their
education level rises, and communication and
transportation infrastructures in rural areas improve. Rural people may become more sensitive
about their relative position in terms of income
and standard of living, while the cost of organizing themselves declines. Fanner organiza-
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tions emerge that, once established, have a vested
interest in lobbying not only on behalf of farmers but also on behalf of themselves. The same
is true of a new group of manufacturing and service industries producing farm inputs and processing farm outputs. Consequently, the contest
bias approaches unity (a -+ 1) when agriculture
and manufacturing become equally powerful rent
seekers.
Agricultural Protectionism in Developing
Countries

Market intervention policies have played a major role in the differential performance of the
agricultural sectors of both developing and developed countries. These policies include price
supports, taxes, subsidies, tariffs, and exchange-rate market interventions. Agricultural
poIicy in advanced industrial counrries has been
characterized by strong protection of domestic
producers by means of trade restrictions and direct price supports. In contrast, developing
countries have exploited agriculture by such
means as export taxes and overvalued exchange
rates.
Table 1 summarizes average nominal rates of
agricultural protection in 33 developed, newly
industrialized, and developing countries. The
table presents estimates of the degrees of direct
and indirect intervention in agricultural com-

modities. These protection coefficients are indices representing between 50 and 80% of the
total value of agricultural output for each of the
countries. The first column illustrates the impact
of "direct" pricing policies. The direct nominal
protection rate measures the proportional difference between the domestic producer price and
the border price (after adjustment for transport,
storage, and other costs and quality differentials) measured at the official exchange rate.
Figures for 13 developed countries and two newly
industrialized countries (Korea and Taiwan) included in table 1 are averages of those figures
obtained by Anderson and Hayami.
Studies financed by the World Bank have
provided data on domestic and border prices of
agricultural commodities, exchange rate market
intervention, and protection afforded to the nonagricultural sector of I8 developing countries
from 1960 to 1984. Direct nominaI protection
rates show that most countries adopted policies
resulting in the equivalent of export taxes on agricultural commodities.' Brazil and Turkey are
among countries protecting the agricultural sector because they are traditionaI importers of food
products. The most surprising finding, shown in
the second column, is the impact of indirect in-

'

Developing countries stud~cdcontaln a much rtchcr and d ~ s aggregated data set of protection ratcs at the level o f ~ndtvidual
cornrnodtt~es.A stmplc average of all 18 countries shows subs~dtes
o f 3 1 % for stapks, 12% for ~rnponables,and 15% for exportables
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Nominal Rates of Agricultural Protection

Country

Period

Direct

Sw~tzerland
lapan
Italy
Sweden
Germany
France
The Netherlands
United Kingdom
Korea
Denmark
Br a z ~ l
Taiwan
United States
Turkey
Ausrral~a
Canada
New Zealand
Ch11e
Philipp~nes
Colornb~a
Paktstan
Srl Lanka
Malay sta
Morocco
Zambia
Portugal
Argentina
Dom~nicanRepublic
Egypt
Thailand
Cote d'lvorre
Ghana

55-80
55-80
55-80
55-80
55-80
55-80
55-80
55-80
55-80
55-80
69-83
55-80
55-80
60-83
55-80
55-80
55-80
60-83
60-86
60-83
60-86
60-85
69-83
63-84
66-84
60-84
60-84
66-85
64-84
62-84
60-82
58-76

85.8
60.5
54.5
49.2
45.2
32.5
28.3
27.5
18.5
12 3
10 1
8.3
4 5
42
28
25
-1.0
- 1.2
-4 1
-4 8
-6.4
-9.0
-9.4
- 15.0
-16 3
-[66
- [7 8
-18 6
-24.8
-25.1
-25.7
-26.9

Indirect

-

18.4

Tutal

-8 3

-36 8

-32.6

-20.4
-23 3
-25.2
-33 1
-31,l
-8.2
-[74
-29 9
-I 2
-21 3
-21 3
- 19.6
- 15.0
-23.3
-32 6

-21.6
-27 4
- 30.0
-39 5
-40 1
- 17 6
-32 4
-46 2
-17 8
-39 1
-39 9
-44.4
-40.1
-49 0
-59 5

Sources. Anderson and hay am^: Valdcs

tervention . Indirect effects include both the effect of trade and macroeconomic policies on the
exchange rate and the extent of protection afforded to nonagricultural commodities. Discrimination against agricuItura1 commodities in
policies external to agriculture has a greater impact on agricultural incentives (a tax equivalent
of 23%) than do policies aimed directIy at agriculture. The results for total price interventions, however, show that the dominant pattern
has been one of systematic and sizeable discrimination against agriculture (Valdes).
Our framework suggests the optimal policy
choice is conditioned by the contest strength term,
a , and by the poIitical institutional environment
term, W. The regulator chooses intervention
levels measured by the nominal protection coefficient. The nominaI protection coefficient reflects relative group strength and other aspects
of the political process, such as equity, that affect the probability of the regulator's remaining
in power. Using World Bank data, we estimate
a reduced form equation for a set of 18 devel-

oping countries with the objective of rdentifying
a relation between policy choice and factors affecting a and W. The dependent variable is the
nominal protection coefficient (NPC) for key
agricultural product^.^ The NPC is the mult~ple
by which government policies have raised the
domestic value of agricultural output above its
value at international prices.
Three variables are used to capture players'
relative efficiencies as rent seekers-share of
agriculture in GDP, share of agriculture in labor
force, and share of agriculture in consumption.
We hypothesize that the agricultural sector's rentseeking power declines as the sector's relative
size increases. Larger sectors cost more to subsidize, are more difficult to organize, and are
more likely to be subsistence sectors, implying
they could benefit Iess from price enhancement.

! T'ncrc arc three to seven products lncluded per country. These
products represent from 60 to 80% of agr~cul~ural
produc[~c>n.
For
detalls, see Fulplnlti and Shogren
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Institutional environment, constituent welfare, and other considerations will also a f k r the
probability that a certain sector will be taxed.
First, we consider public finance motives for
taxing agriculture versus other sectors. Land per
capita and producrivity per person in agriculture3
are used, based upon the hypothesis that the
public revenue potential of agricultural taxation
rises with the value of agricultural resources. Ir
is therefore expecred that the greater the labor
productivity in agriculture and the more land per
capita, the less the protection afforded to agricultural commodities. The share of agriculture
in trade and the dummy variables for both exportables and importables are introduced to reflect developing countries' preference of commodity over income taxadon. Tradables are easier
to tax than nontradables .
Second, we examine equity and distributional
motives for taxing agriculrure versus other sectors. Two variables are included to capture equity considerations-interventions in the exchange rate market and import substitution
policies on the agricultural sector. Currency
overvaluation, represented by the ratio of the
equilibrium exchange rate to the actual exchange rate, is assumed to link macropolicy and
the agricultural sector. The issue is whether there
is more pressure for direct protection in proportion to how overvalued the currency becomes, a relation implying the offsetting effect
of commodity market intervention. The indirect
protection coefficient (NPCI), captures both the
effects of import policies protecting the nonagricultural sector and the effects of policies
distorting the exchange rate market. These variables are included to allow evaluation of whether
the regulator has a tendency to use price protection to redistribute towards the group subject
to heavy indirect taxes.
Third, we consider the "food favoritism" motive for taxing agriculture versus other sectors.
We hypothesize food products will be subject to
tax treatment different from nonfood products as
both self-sufficiency in food production and cheap
food are often policy objectives in developing
countries. To identify possible differential treatment, a dummy variable for food products is introduced.

'

The productivity ratio is an ~ n d e xo f the ratio of labor productlvlty In agnculture to labor productiv~tyIn industry. Labor productivity in agnculture 1s measured as agricultural output per worker,
and labor productivity in Industry is approximated as average GDP
per worker for the wholc wonomy
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Fourth, we include residual effects systematically related to income. The country's weaith,
represented by income per capita, captures relative differences in development and is introduced as a proxy for characreristics thar are
country-specific and have not been captured by
variables already included.
Regression analysis is used on a pooled cross
section time series data set of 18 countries from
1960-84 and yields 1,858 data points. Interpretation of the coefficients as causal impacts on
protection should be made with caution because
explanatory variables might depend upon protection level. Thus we will refer to association
rather than to causation, given the possibility of
simultaneous equation bias. The regression was
run in log-linear form, except for variables representing the relative shares of the agricultural
sector and of agricultural trade in the economy.
Table 2 summarizes estimations for different
combinations of explanatory variables, regressions ( 1) to (4). The coefficient of determination
indicata that about 60% of the variarion in NPCs
among countries and over time are explained.
Coefficients of the three proxies of the contest
strength term fi have the expected sign but are
insignificant. This fact does not mean rhat the
sector's relative rent-seeking power is a factor
to be disregarded; rather, it might reflect the
quality of the variables used to capture a. Both
variables used ro reflect public revenue potential
of agricultural taxation-land per capita and labor productivity ratio-show the expected sign
and are highly significant. This confirms the belief that agriculrurally well-endowed economies
rend to discriminate against the sector and extract some land rents.
The share of agricultural trade in GDP seems
important inasmuch as it shows a negative correlation to NPCs and provides evidence that developing countries favor generating revenue by
taxing exportable commodities. The greater the
proporiion of agricultural commodities exported, the more likely regulators will be to tax
the sector. Coefficients of both exponable and
importable dummies are significant, indicating
thar importables are protected relative to exportables. The two variables suggesting equity
considerations are highly significant, indicating
that when the real exchange rate is low, there is
pressure for protection. The more the secror is
indirectly taxed, the less it is directly taxed,
supporting rhe hy porhesis thar a regulator will
lessen ihe burden of the sector under heavy taxation. The coefficient of the food dummy variable is insignificant, suggesting rhat food and
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Table 2. 1960-84
parentheses)

J Agr Econ

Regressions for Nominal Protection Coefficien (I-statistics in

Independent variables

(1)

(2)

(3)

(41

Share of agriculture
in GDP
m labor force

Land per capita
Labor productivity ratlo
Share of ag, trade in

GDP

E~portables
Importables
Currency overvaluation

-0. LOO
(-3 98)

-0.007
(-5.64)
0.260
(2 88)
0 630
(7 22)
0 220
(3 31)

NPR lndirect
Food
Income per capita
Intercept

R'

nonfood products are treated alike. The effect
of average income is significant and positive,
indicadng country characreristics related to wealth
are not accounted for by the remaining variables.
Summary and Conclusions

This paper examines policy intervention in agriculture as the outcome of the interaction between self-interested politicians and producer and
consumer groups affected by policy choices.
According to this approach, politicians competing for support choose the intervention level
maximizing their expected utility without jeopardizing the likelihood of their remaining in office. Players in the agricultural and the manufacturing sectors decide how much effort to invest
in order to increase rhe probability of winning
the rent created by the regulator's policy choice.
Their choice depends upon the strategic timing
of effort and on the sharing rule, given the relative strength of the groups involved. Players'
strength is captured by a contest bias term hypothesized to depend upon disparities in income
endowments between groups, deadweight losses

of redistribution, cost of developing and maintaining polidcally cohesive groups, and availability of tax instruments.
Regression analysis on pooled cross-secdon,
time series data of 18 developing counrries reveals that agriculturally well-endowed economies discriminate against agriculture; the higher
the proportion of agricultural exports, the more
likely that regulators wrll tax the sector; and as
a result of equity considerations, the more a sector is directly taxed, the less it will be indirectly
taxed.
Our paper has been motivated in part by Baldwin. By emphasizing the economic self-interest
of the political participants, we have attempted
to "understand the policy-making process that
leads politicians to disregard the advice of economists on issues of inrernational trade." Economic self-interestaImost a1ways dominates when
a significant part of an individual's income is
affected by policy choice. National and group
concerns are likely to dominate personal considerations only when economic self-interesr effects are small or unclear. Although we recognize thar an individual's social concerns can play
an important role in shaping her decisions, our

Fulginiri and Shogren

framework suggests that economic self-interest
explains a certain degree of agricultural protectionism.
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